Introduction
China’s role in the architecture of global multilateral institutions has transformed dramatically from the mid-20th century to today. Once isolated from much of the post-World War II international system, China is now a central player in organizations like the United Nations (UN) and World Trade Organization (WTO), and a driving force behind new frameworks such as BRICS and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). This essay examines China’s historical engagement with multilateral institutions, key milestones in its multilateral diplomacy, and the strategies and goals guiding its participation. It also analyzes international perceptions of China’s growing influence and critiques of its conduct. Finally, it evaluates the claim that China has become the “chief architect” of multilateralism, assessing whether Beijing is now the primary shaper of the contemporary multilateral order or if that title remains contested.
Historical Overview: From Isolation to Integration
In the early decades of the PRC (People’s Republic of China), the country remained largely outside or at odds with the Western-led international order. After the communist revolution in 1949, the PRC was excluded from most international organizations due to Cold War politics and the continued recognition of Taiwan (Republic of China) in China’s UN seat. During 1949–1971, Beijing’s posture toward the global system was what scholar Samuel Kim termed “system-transforming” – the PRC initially sought to reshape or reject the existing order while it lacked representation in key institutions. This period saw China forging ties only with a limited socialist bloc and championing revolutionary rhetoric, until internal and external shifts prompted a change.
A turning point came in 1971, when United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758 recognized the PRC as the legitimate holder of China’s UN seat, including its permanent seat on the Security Council. With this, China’s stance shifted to “system-reforming,” meaning Beijing aimed to reform the UN-centered system from within rather than overturn it. Soon after, China began cautiously opening up to international engagement. Under Deng Xiaoping’s “reform and opening” from 1978 onward, China integrated into the international system at an accelerated pace. In 1980, Beijing joined the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, and by 1982 it resumed GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade) observer status, signaling a new willingness to “exploit” the system for China’s development needs. Whereas in 1977 China was party to only 21 intergovernmental organizations and 45 international treaties, by the mid-2010s it had joined over 130 international organizations and signed 400+ multilateral treaties. This integration laid the groundwork for China’s emergence as a major stakeholder – and increasingly a leader – in global governance.
Key milestones in China’s multilateral diplomacy include:
- 1945: China (Republic of China government) becomes an original member of the UN and a permanent Security Council member. (The seat was later transferred to the PRC in 1971.)
- 1971: PRC enters the United Nations, taking China’s seat on the Security Council – a watershed that ended Beijing’s formal diplomatic isolation.
- 1980: China joins the World Bank and IMF, re-engaging with Bretton Woods institutions to support its modernization.
- 1982: China obtains observer status in GATT (the precursor to the WTO), beginning the long process toward trade integration.
- 2001: After 15 years of negotiations, China accedes to the World Trade Organization on December 11, 2001, opening its markets in return for WTO rules-based access to others. This was hailed as a pivotal step in China’s economic rise, though it also proved contentious in light of mismatches between WTO free-market norms and China’s state-led economic model.
- 2003–2004: China assumes a proactive role in security multilateralism by hosting the Six-Party Talks (2003–2009) on North Korea’s nuclear issue, and launches new diplomatic forums like the China–Africa Forum (FOCAC) in 2000 and the China–Arab States Cooperation Forum in 2004.
- 2009: China co-founds the BRIC (Brazil-Russia-India-China) grouping. The first BRIC Summit is held in 2009, with South Africa joining in 2010 to form BRICS. China thus became part of a coalition of major emerging economies seeking greater voice in global affairs.
- 2013: President Xi Jinping unveils the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a vast infrastructure and connectivity vision spanning Asia, Africa, and beyond. BRI has since become a pillar of China’s international outreach, with Beijing signing cooperation agreements with over 150 countries and 30 international organizations by 2023.
- 2015: China leads in establishing the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) (operational from 2016) and, with BRICS partners, the New Development Bank (NDB). These new multilateral development banks, initiated by China, aimed to complement or challenge Western-dominated lenders by providing alternative funding for emerging economies.
- 2016: China hosts the G20 Summit in Hangzhou, signaling its growing clout in high-level global economic governance. (China’s presidency showcased issues like development and innovation on the G20 agenda.)
- 2017: China hosts the first Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation in Beijing (followed by a second in 2019 and a third in 2023), convening dozens of world leaders to discuss BRI cooperation. Xi Jinping’s 2017 Davos speech also garners global attention as he portrays China as a champion of free trade and multilateral cooperation at a time when Western populism and U.S. protectionism were on the rise.
- 2020s: China emerges as one of the top contributors to UN initiatives – for example, by 2025 China provides the second-largest share (18.7%) of the UN peacekeeping budget (behind only the U.S.) and contributes more personnel to UN peacekeeping than any other permanent Security Council member. China also pushes for reforms to increase developing countries’ influence in institutions and signs mega-regional trade deals like the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) in Asia (2020).
These milestones illustrate China’s journey from a marginal participant to a heavyweight in multilateral forums. Each step – from entering the UN and WTO to spearheading new coalitions – has both increased China’s stake in the international order and given it new tools to shape that order’s evolution.
Signage for the Third Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation in Beijing (October 2023). The Belt and Road Initiative, launched in 2013, has become a central pillar of China’s international engagement, involving infrastructure projects and cooperation agreements with over 150 countries.
China’s Strategies and Goals in Multilateral Settings
Over the past two decades, Beijing’s approach to multilateral institutions has evolved from cautious participation to active agenda-setting. China’s overarching strategy is often characterized as a dual track: working within established institutions to increase its influence and promote its values, while also creating new platforms aligned with its interests. On one hand, China portrays itself as a staunch supporter of the existing multilateral system – repeatedly calling for “win-win cooperation,” respect for national sovereignty, and dialogue under the auspices of the UN, WTO, and other global bodies. On the other hand, China has shown willingness to bypass or reshape rules and to form parallel institutions when the existing ones are seen as constraining its rise or dominated by Western powers.
Several key goals underlie China’s multilateral engagement:
- Economic Development and Trade Expansion: Gaining entry into the WTO was primarily a strategic move to boost China’s economic growth through access to global markets. The results were dramatic – after 2001, China became the world’s largest exporting nation and the second-largest economy. Beijing continues to champion the multilateral trading system rhetorically, as it benefits from global trade integration. However, as China’s economy matured, it grew more skeptical of certain WTO rules that it views as unfavorable. Since the 2010s, China has selectively hedged by pursuing regional trade agreements and the BRI, establishing a China-centric network of trade and investment alongside the WTO framework. This strategy is evident in initiatives like RCEP and the Belt and Road, which embed China at the hub of new trade and infrastructure linkages.
- Shaping Rules and Norms: Within global institutions, China seeks to amplify norms of state sovereignty and “development first” that align with its governance model. For instance, in UN forums China often emphasizes non-interference in internal affairs and the primacy of economic development and stability over liberal interventionist agendas. It works to ensure that multilateral outcomes (e.g. climate agreements, human rights reviews) accommodate its interests and those of fellow developing countries. To gain sway, Beijing has increased its financial contributions and placed Chinese officials in key positions in international agencies. By the early 2020s, Chinese nationals headed 4 of the 15 UN specialized agencies (including the FAO and ITU), more than any other nation. China has courted support from the Global South – for example, leveraging its strong ties in Africa (via forums like FOCAC) to secure votes for Chinese candidates in UN bodies. Such efforts aim to influence global policy directions in areas like development finance, technical standards, and internet governance in line with Chinese preferences.
- Building Alternative Institutions: A signature element of China’s strategy is the creation of new multilateral institutions and partnerships as alternatives or complements to legacy Western-led bodies. The BRICS forum (and its New Development Bank), the AIIB, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), and the BRI forums all exemplify Beijing’s proactive institution-building. These platforms serve multiple purposes: they amplify voices of China and other non-Western states, provide channels to advance large-scale projects (e.g. infrastructure under BRI) with fewer political conditions, and challenge the monopoly of the U.S.-led order without direct confrontation. For instance, the Belt and Road Initiative – though comprising mostly bilateral projects – has been framed by China as an inclusive multilateral endeavor, with summit forums that endorse principles of cooperation and connectivity. As one analysis notes, Beijing uses BRI to strengthen the Global South as a counterweight to the U.S.-led international order. In short, China’s goal is to embed itself as a central node in global governance, whether by taking leadership roles in existing institutions or by founding new ones that reflect its own development-first, sovereignty-respecting philosophy.
- Enhancing Global Status and Soft Power: Active multilateral diplomacy also serves China’s aim of being recognized as a great power with international legitimacy. Hosting high-profile events (Olympics, World Expo, G20 summit, BRF forums) and brokering international agreements elevate China’s diplomatic stature. Beijing often presents itself as a voice for developing nations, for example by advocating for greater African and Asian representation in bodies like the UN Security Council or by providing COVID-19 vaccines and development aid under multilateral umbrellas. These efforts project an image of China as a responsible stakeholder and an alternative leader for a multipolar world, in contrast to what Chinese officials describe as U.S. unilateralism. Indeed, Chinese leaders frequently call for “true multilateralism,” implying that international rules should not be dictated by one bloc but agreed by all. Under President Xi, China’s diplomatic messaging has leaned heavily into phrases like building “a community of shared future for mankind,” signaling an aspiration to shape a new form of global order with China at the table as an agenda-setter.
International Perceptions and Critiques of China’s Role
China’s expanded role in multilateral institutions has elicited a mix of acknowledgement, optimism, caution, and criticism from the international community. Perspectives vary widely between developing countries, Western powers, and independent observers.
Many developing countries view China’s rise in multilateral forums in a positive light. In Africa, Asia, and Latin America, China is often seen as elevating the voice of the Global South and providing tangible benefits through initiatives like BRI investments and increased South-South cooperation. China’s voting power and financial clout in institutions have sometimes aligned with the interests of poorer nations – for example, China has advocated for greater developing-world influence in the IMF and World Bank, and it often counters Western positions on issues like human rights interventions by invoking respect for sovereignty (a principle many developing governments strongly support). The growing alignment of a significant number of Global South countries with China in multilateral votes and forums attests to Beijing’s successful diplomacy in these regions. To these countries, China’s willingness to challenge what it calls “hegemonic” dominance in global affairs can be a welcome balance that makes the international system more multipolar and equitable. Additionally, Chinese-led institutions like the AIIB have been cautiously welcomed by some as filling infrastructure financing gaps without the stringent conditionalities of Western lenders.
However, from the perspective of Western governments and many analysts, China’s multilateral activism is met with wariness and criticism. A common critique is that Beijing’s engagement is highly self-interested and selectively adherent to international rules. For instance, China proclaims support for the UN-centered order, yet it has refused to accept certain international legal rulings – a notable example being the 2016 UNCLOS tribunal decision against China’s South China Sea claims, which Beijing simply ignored. In trade, China’s WTO entry was expected to spur liberal reforms, but Western officials argue that China instead maintained a state-driven model (subsidizing state-owned enterprises, restricting market access, etc.) that the WTO was ill-equipped to discipline. Even after nearly two decades in the WTO, China had not been recognized as a “market economy” by many counterparts due to these structural issues, a stance affirmed by a WTO panel in 2019 that upheld the EU’s refusal to grant China market economy status. Such outcomes fuel the view that China benefits from multilateral rules while not fully playing by their spirit – hence accusations that Beijing is a “free rider” or a revisionist power trying to bend rules in its favor.
Another area of concern is China’s influence within international organizations. Western officials have raised alarms that Chinese heads of agencies (like the FAO or ITU) might skew those bodies’ priorities to align with Chinese government interests, potentially undermining the neutrality of multilateral institutions. For example, the FAO under a Chinese director-general was noted for supporting BRI-linked agricultural projects, prompting questions about politicization of a U.N. agency. There are also instances cited where China has used its clout to suppress discussion of issues sensitive to Beijing (such as opposition to references of human rights abuses in Xinjiang or Hong Kong at UN forums), leading to charges that China’s greater voice could erode certain international norms like human rights and transparency. Moreover, China’s substantial financing of and personnel contributions to the UN come with an expectation, some critics say, of deference to Chinese preferences – for instance, the UN’s silence or muted tone on some China-related controversies is interpreted by these observers as evidence of Beijing’s leveraging of multilateral institutions to shield itself from criticism.
Critiques also extend to the Belt and Road Initiative, arguably China’s most ambitious international venture. While over 150 countries have signed onto BRI projects, skeptics note that BRI agreements lack transparency and often involve bilateral deals that favor Chinese companies and lending terms. Western officials have sometimes dubbed BRI a form of “debt-trap diplomacy,” accusing China of ensnaring poorer nations in unsustainable debts to gain strategic leverage – though many economists dispute the pervasiveness of this claim. Nonetheless, the governance of BRI is largely China-driven; unlike, say, a UN development program, BRI has no multilateral decision-making body where other nations have equal say. This leads to debate over whether BRI truly embodies multilateralism or merely Chinese bilateral outreach packaged in multilateral rhetoric. Recent years have seen some pushback: for example, several Asian and African countries have renegotiated BRI loan terms, and Europe has grown more cautious about BRI’s strategic implications. The international perception of China as a champion of multilateralism is thus mixed – admired when China contributes constructively (as in climate talks or peacekeeping funding), but criticized when it appears to undermine universal norms or create parallel structures that might weaken existing institutions.
Finally, it is important to note that China’s rise coincided with a relative pullback by the United States in certain multilateral arenas, especially during 2017–2020. The Trump administration’s unilateralist turn (e.g. quitting the Paris Agreement and UNESCO, hobbling the WTO dispute system, threatening to cut UN funding) created a leadership void that China in some ways tried to fill – at least rhetorically. This “leadership contrast” led some commentators to label Xi Jinping as an unlikely champion of the liberal trading order. Yet, many in the West remained skeptical, seeing China’s newfound enthusiasm for global agreements as opportunistic. For instance, European analyses describe Chinese multilateralism as “à la carte” – supportive when it aligns with Chinese interests, and obstructive or evasive when it does not. Beijing’s refusal to ratify core international conventions on political and labor rights (China has not ratified the ICCPR and key ILO conventions on freedom of association) further fuels criticism that it cherry-picks aspects of the international order to uphold. In essence, while China declares itself a proponent of a “community of common destiny,” detractors argue that its vision of multilateralism is state-centric and regime-centric, prioritizing national sovereignty and development gains over the liberal values and legal constraints that have also been part of the post-1945 multilateral order.
Conclusion: Is China the ‘Chief Architect’ of Contemporary Multilateralism?
China’s influence in 21st-century multilateral institutions is undeniable – but whether it is the “chief architect” of multilateralism is a matter of perspective and definition. Historically, the architecture of the modern multilateral system (the UN, Bretton Woods institutions, GATT/WTO, etc.) was largely designed by Western powers (chiefly the United States) in the aftermath of World War II. For decades, China was more of a participant or latecomer to this architecture than a shaper of its foundational rules. However, as this essay has shown, China has progressively shifted into a more activist role, especially in the past 20–30 years. Today, Beijing is arguably a leading architect of new multilateral frameworks – such as the Belt and Road Initiative’s cooperative networks, the AIIB, and groupings like BRICS – and it is a key power influencing the evolution of established institutions like the UN and WTO from within.
Those who argue China is now the chief architect of multilateralism point to Beijing’s ambitious agenda and initiatives filling gaps left by a retreating U.S. For example, China’s convening of global forums (from the BRF to high-level summits on development and security) and its advocacy for multilateral solutions (in speeches and UN votes) suggest it is carrying the torch of global cooperation in a time of fractured geopolitics. China often presents itself as defending the “rules-based international order” but one that should be reformed to be more inclusive and just – implicitly positioning Chinese leadership as crucial to that reform. In areas like climate change, trade, and pandemic response, China’s participation is indispensable, lending credence to the view that it has become a principal architect shaping outcomes. Furthermore, for many developing nations, China’s initiatives have architected new avenues for South-South collaboration and development financing that did not exist before.
On the other hand, a critical evaluation must acknowledge that multilateralism by nature is a collective enterprise, and China’s vision of global governance is only one among several major forces. The European Union, for instance, remains a powerful champion of multilateral agreements (on issues from climate to human rights). The United States, despite recent unilateralist phases, still plays an outsized role in setting the agenda of institutions like the World Bank, IMF, NATO, and even the UN (not least through financial power and alliances). Other actors – middle powers, international NGOs, private corporations – also shape the multilateral landscape. In this context, labeling China the chief architect may be an overstatement. China is certainly a chief architect in some domains (infrastructure connectivity, new development banks) and a major co-architect in others (trade rules, UN reforms), but it has not singlehandedly designed the system so much as worked to adjust and supplement it. Moreover, some of China’s contributions, like the BRI, operate in a hybrid space between bilateral and multilateral, which critics argue falls short of the openness and reciprocity that true multilateral leadership requires.
China’s journey from an isolated revolutionary state to a pillar of global multilateralism is a remarkable historical trajectory. By 2025, China has evolved into one of the foremost champions of multilateral cooperation – hosting summits, funding international operations, and integrating dozens of countries into its own cooperative initiatives. This marks a significant shift in the center of gravity in world affairs. Yet, the claim that China is the “chief architect” of contemporary multilateralism should be viewed with nuance. China is re-shaping parts of the multilateral order and providing important new blueprints, particularly for developing-world connectivity and finance. However, the overall architecture of global governance remains a cumulative construction, built on legacies and led by multiple actors. Beijing’s influence is rising, but it exists alongside Washington’s postwar framework and the contributions of many others. Whether China will eventually assume a singular leadership role in defining global norms is uncertain and will depend on how it addresses the existing doubts about its intentions and how other nations respond. What is clear is that China has moved from being a rule-taker to a rule-maker. The balance of evidence suggests that China is an architect – perhaps the chief architect of some new multilateral mechanisms – but not the sole or uncontested designer of the multilateral world order as a whole. The evolution of multilateralism in the 21st century is a story of both continuity and change, with China playing an increasingly central, yet not all-dominating, role in crafting that narrative.
Sources: China’s multilateral diplomacy historical overview; Expansion of China’s participation in IGOs; Key multilateral summits hosted by China; WTO accession and controversies; China’s influence strategy in UN agencies; Belt and Road agreements and goals; Critical perspectives on China’s trade and human rights compliance; Analysis of China’s new institutional initiatives.
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Shahid Hussain Soomro is a Research Scholar at the Area Study Centre for Africa, North and South America, Quaid-i-Azam University, and a faculty member in the Department of Pakistan Studies at Virtual University of Pakistan. He focuses on international security, digital disinformation, and South Asian geopolitics. He is also the co-founder of The Cyber World Insight.
He can be reached at shahid@cyberworldinsight.com and followed on LinkedIn and CyberWorldInsight.com. ORCID: 0000-0002-1718-4622 | Google Scholar: Link.
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