Over the past years, South Asia has fallen into the rift of populist leaders who claim to reflect the will of the people and at the same time weaken the democratic norms. Imran Khan in Pakistan and Narendra Modi in India present two very strong examples of right-wing populism due to the influence of the particular political cultures, although into the picture come equally global tendencies. A wider pattern of personalist politics, deinstitutionalisation of checks, and majoritarian discourse- the overarching elements of populist comparative study in the Global South- can be seen in their leadership.
At its essence, populism creates an opposition between the morally upright people and the morally corrupt elite. Such leaders as Khan and Modi pose as moral heroes who uproot, therefore challenge established political classes in the name of national revival. Both came to power democratically, but they used a rhetoric that disavowed the very essence of opposition, the judiciary, and even part of the media. By doing this, they have imitated the populist reasoning existing in other regions of the world – in Turkey, through Erdoğan in Brazil, through Bolsonaro – where the values of charismatic power replace the checks of institutions.
The populism of Imran Khan was a result of an anti-corruption decades-long struggle and the anti-elite rhetoric. Identifying himself as an outsider, he attacked the dynastic political parties in Pakistan, PML-N and PPP, and offered a “Naya Pakistan” (New Pakistan). In office, his governance style, however, showed heavy reliance on the Pakistan military establishment, little tolerance to speech, and growing personalization of power. During the time of Khan, a parliamentary opposition was suppressed, journalists were pressured, and civil society were pushed to the sidelines in the name of cleaning up the system.
On the contrary, populism in Narendra Modi is entrenched in Hindu nationalism. Although Khan had appealed to the religious nostalgia of the majority of the Muslim identity, the BJP of Modi has sought to espouse Hindutva as the ideology behind Indian nationalism. The success of Modi was also pegged on concerns against elites, notably in the wake of corruption scandals in the Congress-led government under the UPA. His rule has, however, transcended into economic populism and into cultural majoritarianism, with policies like the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) and the abrogation of Article 370 in Kashmir being a definite ideological rearrangement of the Indian state.
Although ideologically there is divergence, countries are led by Khan, whose populism is of anti-Western and Islamic colors and by Modi, whose is based on Hindu nationalism and neoliberal state, similarities exist in the institutional outcomes of their reigns. The two leaders have ruled out technocratic rule, and their preference is based on loyalty, degradation of judicial trials and diminishment of deliberative politics. The utilization of mass rallies, direct calls via social media, and demonization of the adversaries are the signs of a decrease in democratic standards in a wider sense over the recent years.
As instances of comparative politics, such cases have been described by political scientist Nancy Bermeo as examples of what she calls executive aggrandizement, or the gradual legalistic dissolution of checks and balances, as opposed to a coup or authoritarian coup. In addition, the experience of both Pakistan and India exemplifies the ways in which populism, depending on the model of state, responds to changing conditions: such weak parliamentary democracy with military domination in Pakistan and a strong electoral democracy becoming progressively threatened by centralization and identity politics in India.
Nevertheless, the careers of Khan and Modi after their climax differ. The toppling October 2022 no-confidence vote that led to the political persecution of Imran Khan highlights the instability of populism in a hybrid regime. Modi, in their turn, has achieved electoral domination, gaining a third term in 2024, though with a decreased parliamentary majority, thus suggesting that populism, when institutionalised, has a longer lifespan at the expense of democracy.
In conclusion, the population in South Asia is not an aberration but a characteristic of modern politics ratified by dissatisfaction over elite performance, economic and social inequalities and identity-based movements. Comparative reading within the framework of Khan/Modi shows how the same results are caused by different environments: Charismatic leaders undermine the institutions in the name of popular sovereignty. Pakistan and India will find difficulty in reconstructing institutions of democracy, which will survive such personalist periods and place constitutionalism back on top instead of charisma.
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